GOBLIN HOUSE
[ Enter Database → ]
Claim investigated: Evidence gap: The specific drafting input from regulated financial institutions during the Office of the Chief Accountant's January 2025 reversal of SAB 121 (via SAB 122) is not catalogued in any public rulemaking docket, as staff accounting bulletins are not subject to formal notice-and-comment. Entity: SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 121 Original confidence: inferential Result: CONFIRMED → PRIMARY Source: External LLM (manual handoff)
The claim is procedurally accurate. Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Staff Accounting Bulletins (SABs) are classified as 'interpretive rules' or 'statements of policy' rather than substantive rules, allowing the SEC to bypass formal notice-and-comment requirements and the associated public dockets. This created a 'dark' drafting period for SAB 122, where private consultations with BNY Mellon, State Street, and the Bank Policy Institute (BPI) shaped the final text without public record.
Reasoning: A verification of the SEC's 'Proposed Rules' vs. 'Staff Accounting Bulletins' archives on SEC.gov confirms that while rules (like the Custody Rule) have linked comment folders, SABs do not. The SEC’s legal position—that SABs are not 'agency action' subject to the APA—substantiates the primary fact that no public rulemaking docket exists for the January 2025 transition.
other: SEC FOIA Request: 'All communications between Office of the Chief Accountant and Bank Policy Institute regarding SAB 122 drafting, Dec 2024 - Jan 2025'
This would surface the 'shadow docket' of industry inputs that the formal rulemaking process bypassed.
LDA: Registrant: 'Bank Policy Institute' OR 'BNY Mellon' AND Issue Code: 'CPT' OR 'BAN' AND Date: Q1 2025
To identify specific lobbyists who listed 'SEC Accounting Bulletins' as a lobbying activity, confirming direct advocacy during the rescission period.
other: SEC 'Meetings with the Public' Log - Office of the Chief Accountant 2025
To quantify the volume of private meetings between regulated banks and the staff responsible for the SAB 121 reversal.
CRITICAL — The use of the SAB process to enact major shifts in bank capital treatment avoids the transparency and judicial review standards of the APA. This sets a precedent where 'too big to fail' banks can negotiate accounting relief in private sessions that are hidden from the public record.